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1   Introduction 
 
Since the seminal work of Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973), a range of methodologies has been 
developed to analyse and decompose the male-female earnings differential, particularly with the 
aim of identifying the portion of the wage gap which reflects discrimination.  The general 
conclusion is that females’ wages lag behind their male counterparts in almost all countries. The 
gap has, however, been narrowing albeit typically at a declining rate over time
1. Based on 
weekly earnings, female-male wage ratios in the US improved from 61.3% in 1978 to 76.8% in 
1993. The figure increased further to 79.4% in 2003 (Blau and Khan, 2007). In other 
industrialized countries in the 1980s, the gender wage ratios ranged from 77% in Sweden to 61% 
in UK (Blau and Khan, 1996). If we look at the comparable figures for East Asian Economies in 
1995, the ratios hovered around 60%, except for the relatively highly developed country of 
Singapore, where the ratio reached 73% (Zveglich and Rodgers, 2004).  The gender wage gap 
therefore remains an issue of concern.  
 
Beginning with the work of Juhn et al. (1991), a recent generation of studies has begun to pay 
serious attention to the overall wage structure in explaining the relative wages of different 
subgroups in the labour market. In doing so, experience in one country is often compared with 
reference to the distributions of male and female earnings elsewhere. Blau and Khan (1996), for 
example, find that the gender wage gap in the US is due in large measure to the relatively wide 
distribution of earnings in that country. If this distribution were as compressed as that in 
Australia or Sweden, then the gender wage gap in the US would be much smaller than it is now.  
 
 
A considerable amount of attention has been directed in both developed and developing 
countries at investigating gender earnings differentials (Altonji and Blank, 1999).Most studies on 
this issue have concentrated on single countries however. Other recent work has also started to 
provide a more truly international perspective. Extending the work of  Stanley and Jarrell (1998), 
Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2005) compare estimates of the gender wage residual gap 
across more than 60 countries. They use meta-analytical methods to evaluate the sources of 
differences in the estimates of the wage gap. In so doing, they establish that issues such as the 
specification of the wage function and estimation methodology have a bearing on the magnitude 
of the estimated wage differential. They also find that there are significant differences between 
countries, but beyond observing that countries differ in their culture they do not explore the 
sources of these findings.  
 
Two other studies may be seen as obvious precursors to the present paper. The first is by Blau 
and Kahn (1996), and attempts to explain international differences in the gender wage gap by 
reference to the distribution of income and a measure of decentralisation of labour relations. Blau 
and Kahn had access to comparable data for relatively few countries, and as a result the authors 
are able to model international differences in the wage gap using only bivariate regressions with 
a very limited number of degrees of freedom. Unsurprisingly in view of this, few of their results 
                                                            
1 It had persisted for as long as four decades after World War II. In the 1980s the gap had shown the inclination to 
narrow. Yet, it showed only a little progress in the 1990s (Blau, Ferber, and Winkler 2002; Goldin 1990; O’Neil 
2000).   3
are statistically significant. The second paper is by Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2007). 
This builds on the authors’ earlier meta-analysis by including country level variables that reflect 
the level of development, the participation rate of women in the labour force, legislation on 
discrimination, and product market competition. They find that the last two of these, in 
particular, have a strong effect in the expected direction. 
 
 
In the present study, we use microdata from 38 countries collected as part of the International 
Social Surveys Programme (ISSP) 2004 to evaluate Oaxaca decompositions of the wage 
differential between men and women, using a consistent methodology across countries. We then 
use macrodata from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators to provide a vector of 
explanatory variables which we hypothesise exert an influence on of the residual gender wage 
gap (the gap that remains after one controls for differences in productivity related factors 
between men and women). The macrodata that we use allow us to add to the vector of 
explanatory variables that has been used in earlier work, by considering the impact of industry 
structure on wage gaps. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first attempt empirically to 
build, from a consistent micro dataset, a multivariate model that explains why the extent of (the 
unexplained component of) the gender wage gap varies. 
 
 
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we develop a theoretical model that helps us 
understand how macroeconomic conditions can affect the wage gap between men and women. In 
so doing we draw upon the seminal theoretical contribution of Becker (1957). In section 3, we 
describe the data and the estimation strategy used in this paper. Empirical findings across nations 
are discussed in Section 4. The final section presents a summary of the main findings of the 
study.   
 
 
2 Conceptual  Framework 
 
To provide a framework for understanding the sources of gender wage discrimination, we 
develop a model of discrimination. Suppose the representative firm faces an inverse demand 
function of the form: 
 
p = αY - βQ             ( 1 )  
         
where Y is the level of demand in the economy and Q is the firm’s sales. It is assumed that the 
firm sells all it produces and has the production function 
 
Q = (M+F)
γ            ( 2 )  
 
where M and F respectively denote employment of male and female labour. Labour supply is 
given by 
 
M = δwm - ηY              ( 3 )  
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F = εwf - θY              ( 4 )  
 
for males and females respectively, where wm and wf respectively denote the gender-specific 
wages. The firm is assumed, following Becker (1957), to engage in taste based discrimination 
against women, so that it behaves as if the female wage is (1+d)wf. Hence the firm’s hedonic 
profit function can be written as 
 






Differentiating with respect to wm and wf and setting the results to zero yields the first order 
conditions. It serves us well to assume at this stage that δ=ε. In this case 
 
wm – wf = dwf – [θ (1+d)-η]Y/2δ         ( 6 )  
 
As expressed in (6), the gap between male and female wages rises with d so long as θY<2δwf, 
and it is readily demonstrated that the wage gap falls as Y increases if and only if θ(1+d)> η . 
Clearly if η=θ then this condition will hold for any positive value of d. In a cross-national 
analysis of wage gaps, we should therefore expect to find a negative relationship between GDP 
per capita and gender wage differentials. 
 
There are, of course, other factors that might also be expected to have a bearing on the extent to 
which the gender wage gap varies across countries. The first of these that we shall consider 
concerns competition (Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer, 2007).  Firms essentially have to pay 
a cost, in terms of lower profits, in order to apply their gender preference in hiring male workers 
over female workers of similar or higher qualification. As non-discriminatory firms are willing to 
hire relatively cheaper (but equally productive) female workers, all other things being equal, 
non-discriminatory firms should out-perform discriminatory firms. This being so, firms with 
considerable market power will be better able to practice discrimination than those operating in 
relatively competitive markets.  In common with Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2007) we 
use the Index of Economic Freedom developed by the Fraser Institute to measure the extent of 
competition.  
 
Factors that influence the overall wage structure - such as the demand for and supply of skills, 
reflected by the share of various industries in GDP - are also likely to be important in explaining 
variations in the gender wage gap over time and across countries. When a country experiences a 
tight labour market as a result of structural transformation and economic growth, firms will opt 
for technological change in production to combat the effect of relatively high labour cost. This 
technological change may not be gender neutral. For instance, the rapid adoption of automation 
in many workplaces has served to reduce the premium on the physical strength of workers, and 
may therefore have contributed to the increased participation of women. More particularly, to the 
extent that women are more likely than men to use computers at work, women as a whole may 
have benefited from the spread of computer technology (Weinberg, 2000).  It is also observed 
that men dominate employment in many blue-collar jobs, particularly those requiring strength. 
We therefore examine the potential impact that industry mix has on gender wage gaps by 
including in our model measures of the proportion of output accounted for by agriculture and by 
manufacturing.    5
 
The openness of an economy will also produce changes in the employment and earnings of 
groups initially subject to discrimination.  Openness leads to competitive pressures. Moreover, 
trade expansion is expected to increase the demand for labour that is relatively abundant in the 
domestic economy. This means that the shift towards globalisation will have different impacts on 
gender wage gaps in different countries; countries that are abundant in a particular type of labour 
are likely to witness an increase in the international demand for goods that embody this type of 
labour. Thus, trade can help close the gap between sexes – in some countries at least.  
 
Recent work by Seguino (2007) has pointed to the impact that female labour market participation 
can have on people’s attitudes to women in the labour market. Using World Values Survey data, 
she shows that a higher participation rate leads to more positive attitudes. We might expect these 
attitudinal changes, over time, to lead to a lowering of discrimination 
 
The above discussion suggests that a number of variables might be expected to influence the 
extent of pay gaps across the sexes. Using countries as data points, we are able in the work that 
follows to investigate the contribution of each of these potential sources of variation in 
discriminatory practice. This allows us to speculate about how gender pay differentials are likely 
to evolve over time. 
 
 
3 Data  and  Methodology 
 
The primary data source for the empirical work that follows is the International Social Surveys 
Programme (ISSP) 2004 microdata. These data are freely available from http://zacat.gesis.org/. 
Much of the data in this dataset is of direct relevance in the context of labour market research. 
For instance, we have data on workers’ age, employment status, schooling and earnings. The 
dataset lacks a measure of actual labor market experience, and so this is proxied (as in many 
other studies) by potential experience in the work reported below. The major merit of the ISSP 
dataset is that, for a large number of countries, it provides consistent measures of individuals’ 
characteristics, earnings, and other variables.  
 
A total sample of 52550 respondents is collected among the 38 countries that make up our study. 
To have a representative sample of wage earners, we restrict our data set to paid employees aged 
16 to 64 and working in a full-time job. The final sample has 19378 observations, and women 
constitute 41.3% of the respondents. 
 
To construct our analysis of the wage differential between sexes, separate male and female (m 




lnwij = Xij βj + μij                        j=m,f              (7) 
 
                                                            
2 Before the work of Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) it was conventional to use a gender dummy in the wage 
regression model as the explanatory variable in explaining gender wage discrimination.    6
where X is a vector of human capital attributes, β is a vector of parameters representing the 
impact of these attributes on wage, and μ is a random error term with zero mean and constant 
standard deviation. We do not make any correction for sample selection bias; though we 
recognise that the decision of women, in particular, to participate in the labour market may be 
non-random, much earlier work suggests that this is not, in practice an issue that greatly distorts 
the values of coefficients in the earnings equations (see, for example, Johnes, 2002). 
 
 
As is customary in the empirical analysis of earning functions, X captures the productivity of a 
worker. It includes education and experience. For the educational attainment, two dummies are 
used for the level of schooling. A unit value is given for the respondents with higher secondary 
education and above and ‘0’ otherwise. Of those who have completed university degree, it was 
assigned a value of ‘1’, and ‘0’ otherwise. Due to data limitations, experience is proxied using 
potential experience in the analysis – (age – years of education -6).  This measure of potential 
experience is likely to be a better proxy for men than women as the latter, in particular married 
women, experience intermittent work due to family responsibility. As such, the rate of return to 
experience for women tends to be underestimated using potential work experience (Mincer and 
Polacheck, 1974), and hence, estimates of gender discrimination may be upwardly biased
3. Other 
variables, namely marital status, union status, location (urban versus rural domicile) and sector of 
employment (public versus private) are controlled for in the models which we estimate for each 
country. These regressions exclude occupation variables since labour market discrimination may 
play a role in occupational attainment.  
 
Average gender earnings differentials may be calculated as: 
            
 ln ݓm- lnݓf =  ࢄm βm - ࢄf βf          (8) 
 
Simple rearrangement yields the familiar Oaxaca decomposition 
      
 lnݓm -  lnݓf = ( ࢄm-   ࢄf) βm + (βm - βf) ࢄf                                                                      (9) 
 
The gender wage gap in (9) arises from two sources. The first term on the right hand side 
represents differences in productivity-related wage-determining factors. The second term reflects 
differences in returns to productivity related factors that males and females receive for the same 
characteristics. This latter term is therefore conveniently referred to as a measure of unjustified 
discrimination. We acknowledge it is an imperfect measure since it is not possible to include all 
potentially relevant characteristics when examining gender wage differentials (at least in the 
absence of panel data which can be used to allow for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity). 
Omitted variables can be a source of bias in any analysis, and we must assume that, in our cross-




3 O’Neil and Polacheck (1993) argue that the closing of the actual and potential experience gap among women helps 
to explain the narrowing of the gender gap in the USA.    7
It must be noted that in Equation (9) we assume that the prices by which characteristic would be 
rewarded in a non-discriminatory setting are given by the vector of prices currently attached to 
male workers, that is βm. Alternative decompositions are investigated by Oaxaca and Ransom 
(1994). Using different definitions of the ‘true’ pay structure will vary the extent of wage 
residual – though most studies find that this variation is quite slight.  
 
Our empirical strategy is to use the above modeling procedure to ascertain, country by country, 
the component of the wage gap that is due to characteristics differentials - the first term on the 
right hand side of equation (9) - and the component that is due to unjustified discrimination – the 
second term on the right hand side of equation (9). We then seek to explain this latter measure by 
using each country as a separate data point in a regression of unjustified discrimination against a 
series of macroeconomic data obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
4 
This allows us to evaluate the effect of macroeconomic environment on discrimination. The 
explanatory variables considered are GDP per capita and the Human Development Index (HDI) 
as an indicators that reflect a country’s well being and economic development; the female labour 
force participation rate (WLFP); the percentage contributions respectively of agriculture and 
manufacturing to GDP (AGR, MAN – we also use the sum of these two variables, AGRMAN in 
some specifications); the ratio of the sum of total exports and imports  to GDP (TRADE); the 
Economic Freedom Index (EFI) as a proxy for the effect of competition; and income inequality 
as measured by the Gini index (GINI).  
 
Our simple regression model therefore takes the following form: 
 
Di = constant + aHDIi + bMANi +cAGRi +dTRADEi +eGDPi + fWLFPi+ gEFIi + hGINIi + μi     
                                                           
i=1,2…38 (10) 
 
where D represents the measure of unjustified wage discrimination. 
 
Note that the magnitude of the unjustified wage discrimination term expresses in Equation (9) is 
influenced by the variables incorporated in the earnings model. There are, however, also likely to 
be unobserved variables that influence the extent of discrimination – that is, variables that do not 
appear in our dataset, but which reflect heterogeneity across countries. To reduce this 
unobserved heterogeneity, we supplement our levels analysis (10) with an analysis of the 
determinants of the change over time in discrimination. By thus performing a regression in first 
differences, and assuming that unobserved variables do not change over time, we can allow for 
unobserved heterogeneity between the countries in our sample. To operationalise this, we 
collected data for two years, 1995 and 2004. It is possible to do this for only 21 countries,
5  and 
so this part of the analysis needs to be treated with caution.  
                                                            
4 We focus on unjustified discrimination as a dependent variable, rather than the whole wage gap, because the 
source of the difference between these two measures is already  known to be the vector of explanatory variables in 
the wage equations. 
5 24 countries were surveyed in ISSP 1995. Two countries, namely, Italy and Lithuania are not covered in ISSP 
2004 while earnings information is not available for the Philippines. This leaves only 21 countries that match the 
ISSP 2004 dataset.  
   8
 
Using (9), the change in the wage gap difference (D) between two distinct time periods can be 
decomposed as follows: 
 
D04 – D95 = βm04 (ΔX04 -  ΔX95) + ΔX95( (βm04 - βm95) + Xf04(Δβ04 - Δβ95) +  Δβ95(Xf04 - Xf95) 
           ( 1 1 )  
 
where Δ denotes gender difference in the mean value of the explanatory variables and subscripts 
04 and 95  represent years 2004 and 1995 respectively.  
 
According to this decomposition, changes in the gender earnings differentials arise from four 
sources. The first term on the right hand side reflects observable gender differences in 
characteristics. The second term captures differences in prices for these characteristics. The third 
term indicates the differences in observable prices for equal characteristics between men and 
women. The last term measures the differences in individual characteristics between women. The 
unjustified discrimination therefore is attributed to the last two components in (11).  
 
<TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE> 
 
Descriptive statistics for the main variables used in our analysis appear in Table 1. Those for the 
microeconomic variables refer to the full sample of 38 countries, and so are based on almost 
20000 observations. Those for the macroeconomic variables refer to the 38 country level 
observations. In view of the fact that the data are drawn primarily from developed countries, they 
reveal no surprises. We do not report descriptives separately by gender in the table, but it is 
worth observing that the mean values of both the education variables are slightly higher for 
women than for men; some 46 per cent of women complete upper secondary education, 
compared with just 41 per cent of men, and the corresponding figures for completion of 
university education are 22 and 19 per cent respectively. Women are also more likely than men 





Table 2 shows, for each country in our analysis, the adjusted log difference in weekly hour 
wages between men and women, evaluated using the 2004 ISSP data.
6 In all but two countries, 
men earned higher wages than women. The gap is largest in Japan (cf Johnes and Tanaka, 2007). 
Once we adjust for gender differences in characteristics – that is, when we look only at the last 
term in equation (9) – the extent of the gender wage gap actually widens in many countries. 
Indeed in the majority of countries, the characteristics effect is negative. This indicates that, by 
2004, women have characteristics that, on average, place them better than men in terms of labour 
                                                            
6 In most countries, the ISSP reports monthly earnings. The weekly hour wage of each individual is then calculated 
using information from the survey about the individual’s typical weekly work hours. For some countries, earnings 
data are grouped. In this case, the midpoint of each group is used (and, for the top group, earnings are assumed to be 
10% above the cut off).  
   9
market opportunities. That female wages are, on average, and other things being equal, lower 
than male wages would appear to be purely due to the price effect. In many countries, low 








In Table 3, we report the results obtained for the group of 21 countries for which analysis is 
possible for both 1995 and 2004. The total wage gap has narrowed markedly in Japan, albeit 
from a particularly wide starting position. It has also narrowed in several east European 
countries, providing some casual evidence in favour of the view that increased competition in the 
wake of economic transition has helped reduce gender differentials. In many other countries, 
however, the wage gap widened somewhat over this period according to our data. This is due to 
a mix of characteristics and price effects. Increases in the latter (what we have called 
‘unjustified’ discrimination) have been particularly pronounced in Netherlands, Canada, the 
United States and Australia. It is likely that this is due to a well documented tendency for the 
gender wage gap to be procyclical (Park and Shin, 2005), the period under consideration being 
one of sustained growth. Over the same period, there have been large changes in the 
characteristics effect in Ireland, Poland and Russia. For the latter two countries, this is likely 
associated with the process of transition. Comparing wage decomposition between 1995 and 
2004, the characteristics effect is moving in a direction that is favourable to women in most 
countries. The price (‘unjustified’ discrimination) effect is also moving in a favourable direction 
in some countries – but by no means all. 
 
<TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE> 
 
 
As we have seen in Tables 2 and 3, discrimination varies across countries. What might explain 
the variation and persistence in the wage gap across nations despite an improvement in female 
labour market attributes? Could it be explained by the complexity of changes in the overall 
macroeconomic environment? To answer this question we now use the above Oaxaca wage 
residual coefficients to examine the link between macroeconomic environment and the price 
effect (‘unjustified’ discrimination) component of the wage gap, taking advantage of the 
variation in experience that is observed across the countries in our sample.  (We focus here on 
explaining the ‘unjustified’ discrimination component rather than on explaining the whole of the 
                                                            
7 This finding should be qualified, however. The ISSP data force upon us the use of a parsimonious specification of 
the wage equation, and this likely biases downward the proportion of the wage gap that is accounted for by gender 
differences in characteristics. Moreover, the lack of an actual experience variable in the data means that our measure 
of work experience is biased upwards for women, thereby making their characteristics appear more favourable than 
they might truly be. These factors may explain, in some measure, the finding of a perverse sign on the characteristics 
effect for many countries. Nevertheless, the characteristics of women and men have converged over time in many 
economies, to the extent that an appropriately weighted average of women’s education and years of experience 
(though not full-time equivalent experience) compares favourably with a similar measure for men.    10
wage gap because the part that is not due to ‘unjustified’ discrimination is known to be explained 
by characteristics effects. The results are reported in Table 4.  
 
<TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE> 
 
 
The first column of Table 4 presents a basic model to explain the variation in ’unjustified’ 
discrimination.  The model is based on a variant of equation (10). The coefficient signs reported 
in column 1 follow the expected patterns. Instead of using GDP to reflect the income level of a 
country, we refer to GDP per capita since it takes into account the size of population. But per 
capita GDP gives no indication of the distribution of that income within the country. We 
therefore test the impact on ’unjustified’ discrimination of a measure of equality of income 
distribution, namely the Gini coefficient. We find that per capita GDP is significantly negatively 
related to the wage residual. An increase in the Gini coefficient, on the other hand, serves to 




The limitations of GDP as a measure of development are well rehearsed in standard textbooks. 
To check for the robustness of our finding, we therefore experiment with an alternative measure. 
To be specific, in column 2 we explore the possibility that the Human Development Index (HDI) 
has content in explaining variation in the gender wage residual. This index measures the average 
achievements of countries in three basic dimensions of human development: life expectancy, 
literacy (education), and standard of living. As such, this measure focuses attention on wider 
aspects of development than the per capita income measurement. Because HDI includes GDP 
per capita in its measurement, a strong correlation between the two explanatory variables is 
observed (r=0.879) and so, owing to issues of multicollinearity, we have not estimated models in 
which both variables appear.  Once the GDP measure is dropped, the coefficient of HDI is 
remarkably robust as an explanatory variable in our equation. Results in column 2 indicate that a 
unit increase in HDI, holding other explanatory variables unchanged, would reduce the 
(‘unjustified’ component of the) wage gap by 0.636.  
 
To explore further the factors leading to international differences in ‘unjustified’ discrimination, 
we conduct an indirect test of the model of discrimination proposed by Becker (1957). 
According to Becker, firms who have a taste preference for hiring male workers must act as if 
they are willing to forgo some income in order to avoid employing female workers of equal 
productivity. But non-discriminating employers can lower their costs of production by 
employing female workers of equal productivity as men. Such labour cost saving will allow them 
to compete successfully against those firms who discriminate against women. In such a setting, 
growing competition in the product market should eventually weed out employers with 
discriminatory tastes. To test whether the effect of global competition on the commodity market 
indeed reduces price differences for the same labour, we extend our simple regression by 
including a variable for competition (proxied by the Economic Freedom Index, EFI). This index   11
is based on five subcategories
8. This index is designed to capture the degree of economic 
freedom in a society. As things turn out, the coefficient on the economic freedom variable is not 
of the expected sign and statistically insignificantly different from zero at conventional levels 
(column 3). It is, of course, possible that a purer measure of competition might provide a 
different result. For instance, low inflation rate and low money supply growth rate will have only 
a second-order effect on the degree of competition in a society, if they have any effect at all. The 
size of the public sector may have a neutral impact on competition – at least so long as it does 
not adversely affect company taxes (Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer, 2007).  
 
To overcome these problems with the economic freedom index, we decided to experiment also 
with an alternative measure of competition, namely the value of trade (imports plus exports) as a 
proportion of GDP. This measurement is used to examine the effect of globalization on the 
occupational gender wage gap by Oostendorp (2004). The coefficient of trade variable is 
associated with a reduction in gender wage residual, but is only marginally significant.  
 
International trade affects not only the degree of competition; it also induces change in the 
demand for skilled labour as suggested by trade theory. Changes in the skill composition of the 
demand for labour are unlikely to be gender-neutral. We therefore add to our list of explanatory 
variables the shares of agriculture and of manufacturing in GDP as proxies for the demand for 
skilled labour.  Although the results show that shares of agriculture and manufacturing to GDP 
are directly related to a larger magnitude of the gender wage residual, the coefficients are 
statistically insignificant.   
 
In column 6, we include the HDI, Gini index, openness to trade, industry mix, and the female 
labour force participation rate in our specification.  All the parameter coefficients follow our a 
priori expectations, except that attached to the Gini index. However, only the trade variable turns 
out to be statistically significant. HDI and the share of agriculture to GDP fall short of 
significance.  
 
When we added the share of agriculture and manufacturing together, the parameter coefficients 
for trade and HDI are statistically significant. The results imply that increases in the HDI and 
openness tend to reduce the level of discrimination.  
 
<TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE> 
 
 
Re-estimating variants of equation (10) for the smaller sample of 21 countries leads to the results 
reported in Table 5. The results are broadly similar to those obtained in the earlier analysis, 
though there are some exceptions. The coefficient on the agriculture and manufacturing are 
negative but still insignificant in its effect on ‘unjustified’ wage discrimination. The difference 
between results displayed in columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 is that the latter uses an instrumental 
variable for the Gini coefficient. We have included this to try to correct for potential endogeneity 
between Gini and the dependent variable. As such, an instrumental variable – in this case the 
                                                            
8 It consists size of government; legal structure and security or property rights; access to sound money; freedom to 
trade internationally; and regulation of credit, labour and business.   12
predicted values from a regression of GINI on the ratio of expenditure on education to GDP and   
trade to GDP ratio- is introduced into the model.
9 As can be observed in the table, instrumenting 
for GINI has a substantial impact on the size of the coefficient and the impact of this variable 
becomes highly significant.  
 
Differences in gender wage discrimination encountered by female full-time workers in the 21 
countries over the sample period are informative. Nevertheless, the empirical results reported in 
Tables 4 and 5 should be treated with caution. As noted above, the results may in some measure 
reflect differences in unobserved characteristics.  To net out this effect, we explore the 
determinants of the change in ‘unjustified’ discrimination over time.  We likewise difference the 
explanatory variables used in our earlier analysis; note that we do not have a time series for the 
Gini coefficient, and so this variable is dropped from this part of our analysis.  The results are 
summarised in Table 6.  
 
 
<TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE> 
 
 
These results are similar in some respects, but differ in others, from those that emerged from our 
levels analysis reported in Tables 4 and 5. The key result is that the overall level of development, 
as captured by the HDI, remains a significant negative influence on discrimination.  The trade 
variable that was significant in our levels analysis now falls short of significance.  
 
Although the coefficient attached to the female labour force participation rate is insignificant, the 
sign here is interesting and somewhat counterintuitive. One might expect an increase in relative 
supply to dampen relative wages. But the reverse happens. This may be due to the increased 
voice offered to women by a large female presence in the labour market. Equally it may be the 
case that employers statistically discriminate against women, but that the extent of this statistical 
discrimination lessens as, with increasing participation, they learn more about women’s 







The analysis reported above represents a first attempt to investigate the pattern of unexplained 
gender wage gaps at international level, using multivatiate techniques on a consistent set of 
microdata. We conduct the analysis both in level terms and, in order to allow for unobserved 
                                                            
9 The data on education expenditure to GDP ratio are obtained from World Development Indicators 2006. In an 
earlier version of the paper we used political stance as an instrument, but a referee pointed out that this would likely 
be correlated with the dependent variable. For this reason we have chosen educational investment as an instrument 
that more plausibly influences income distribution but not gender discrimination. We do not, however, believe that 
our attempt to instrument for income inequality is the last word on this issue. Neither do we believe that a blind eye 
should be turned to the issue of potential endogeneity of the Gini coefficient simply because a satisfactory 
instrument is hard to find.     13
heterogeneity across countries, in first differences. Our results support the argument that higher 
GDP per capita and more intense competition will serve to reduce gender wage residuals. To the 
extent that there is increasing competition as a consequence of global integration, and to the 
extent that output grows owing to productivity changes, the gender wage residual due to 
discrimination will tend to diminish naturally over time.  
 
We find also that openness to trade and the perusal of initiatives to promote economic freedom 
are associated with a reduction in discrimination in the gender wage gap. These last findings, in 
particular, suggest that policies to promote development, openness, and economic liberty should, 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Main Variables Used in the Analysis 
 
Variable Mean  Standard  Deviation 
Microeconomic Variables 






Potential experience (years)  22.10  11.83 
Proportion ever married  0.73  0.44 
Proportion union members  0.31  0.46 
Proportion urban domicile  0.33  0.47 
Proportion public sector  0.28  0.45 
Macroeconomic variables 
GDP per capita (2004 US$)  22251.66  15702.67 
Economic Freedom Index  7.17  0.78 
Gini Coefficient  0.35  0.09 
Share of agriculture in GDP  0.04  0.03 
Share of manufacturing in 
GDP 
0.19 0.05 
Ratio of trade to GDP  0.84  0.36 
Human Development Index  0.89  0.07 
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Table 2: Oaxaca Mean Log Wage Decomposition, 2004 
 
   Characteristics Effect  Price Effect   Adjusted F‐M Wage Ratio 
Philippines ‐ 0.1733  0.5317  0.6416 
Chile ‐ 0.0775  0.4237  0.6538 
Uruguay ‐ 0.1387  0.3705  0.7682 
Japan  0.1778  0.368  0.4542 
South Africa ‐ 0.1983  0.3658  0.8325 
Russia ‐ 0.0938  0.3587  0.7351 
Poland ‐ 0.1534  0.3301  0.8233 
Venezuela ‐ 0.1059  0.3153  0.7906 
US ‐ 0.0442  0.3132  0.7310 
Latvia ‐ 0.0456  0.3105  0.7351 
Bulgaria ‐ 0.1130  0.2995  0.8135 
South Korea  0.0657  0.2876  0.6467 
Canada ‐ 0.0118  0.2784  0.7334 
Slovak Rep  0.0021  0.2768  0.7211 
Mexico  0.0303  0.2598  0.7099 
Taiwan  0.0172  0.2567  0.7261 
Australia ‐ 0.0420  0.2472  0.7948 
Czech Rep ‐ 0.0484  0.2445  0.8039 
Cyprus  0.0250  0.2424  0.7326 
Germany  0.0093  0.2371  0.7536 
Portugal ‐ 0.0086  0.2265  0.7821 
Switzerland  0.0794  0.2229  0.6977 
Finland ‐ 0.0697  0.2184  0.8513 
New Zealand ‐ 0.0225  0.2142  0.8083 
Brazil ‐ 0.1280  0.2016  0.9264 
UK ‐ 0.0012  0.1906  0.8106 
Spain ‐ 0.0170  0.1803  0.8367 
Norway  0.0027  0.1696  0.8277 
France  0.0060  0.1561  0.8379 
Austria  0.0106  0.1485  0.8409 
Flanders ‐ 0.0304  0.1385  0.8919 
Israel ‐ 0.0737  0.1366  0.9371 
Hungary ‐ 0.0940  0.1185  0.9755 
Sweden ‐ 0.0252  0.114  0.9112 
Ireland ‐ 0.139  0.1109  1.0281 
Netherlands  0.0527  0.0999  0.8474 
Denmark  0.0439  0.0683  0.8878 
Slovenia ‐ 0.0607 ‐ 0.0998  1.1605 
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Australia  0.0610 ‐ 0.0443  0.1053 
Germany  0.0178 ‐ 0.0085  0.0263 
UK  0.0685 ‐ 0.0172  0.0857 
US  0.1216 ‐ 0.0330  0.1546 
Austria ‐ 0.0571 ‐ 0.0426 ‐ 0.0145 
Hungary ‐ 0.0706 ‐ 0.0148 ‐ 0.0558 
Ireland ‐ 0.2974 ‐ 0.1732 ‐ 0.1242 
Netherlands  0.2065  0.0349  0.1716 
Norway ‐ 0.0109 ‐ 0.0036 ‐ 0.0073 
Sweden ‐ 0.0089  0.0090 ‐ 0.0179 
Czech Rep ‐ 0.1052 ‐ 0.0206 ‐ 0.0846 
Slovenia ‐ 0.1826 ‐ 0.0026 ‐ 0.1800 
Poland ‐ 0.0152 ‐ 0.0835  0.0683 
Bulgaria ‐ 0.0097 ‐ 0.0472  0.0375 
Russia  0.0174 ‐ 0.1195 ‐ 0.1021 
New Zealand  0.0624 ‐ 0.0500  0.0123 
Canada  0.1402  0.0086  0.1487 
Japan ‐ 0.1291  0.0256 ‐ 0.1036 
Spain  0.1075 ‐ 0.0282  0.0794 
Latvia  0.0108  0.0562  0.0670 
Slovak Rep  0.0285  0.0152  0.0437 
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Table 4: The Impact of Macroeconomic Environment on Gender Wage Residual, 2004 



















       
EFI     0.042 
(1.438) 
     





















































0.277  0.284 0.305 0.330 0.341 0.357  0.357 
F  8.086  8.335 6.415 7.078 4.833 4.427  5.117 
Note: Figures in parentheses are t values. 
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Table 5: Regression Analysis Confined to 21 Countries, 2004 






























2  0.267 0.421 
F 2.215  3.908 
           Note: Figures in parentheses are t values. 
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Table 6: Change in Gender Wage Discrimination and Macroeconomic Environment 
 















ΔGDP  1.64E-006 
(0.538) 
          




























ΔAGRMAN          0.034 
(0.096) 
 









ΔEFI           -0.005 
(-0.153) 
Adjusted R
2 -0.037  0.248 0.210  0.251  0.154  0.205  0.117 
F 0.290  7.578  3.662  3.238  1.729  2.289  1.529 
Note: Figures in parentheses are t values. 
 
 